Conscientious Objection and the Individual

Yesterday I participated in a roundtable discussion about conscientious objector status in the military.  The discussion was convened by the Seventh Day Adventist Church, and so much of the discussion concerned the development of the Adventist teaching on military service (similar to Catholic discussions, there was some tension surrounding the question of whether the teaching had, in fact, “developed”).  One thing that stood out to me, though, was the fact that many Adventists today serve as combatants in the military, while many find it incompatible with their faith.  As with other issues in other faith traditions, it seems that a religious believer’s church affiliation tells us less about their own decision-making than it might have in past eras. 

This trend corresponds with the law’s trajectory on conscientious objector status: in World War I, an objector was required to be a member of a pacificist sect; in World War II, the objector’s opposition to war was required to be a product of his “religious training and belief”; and post-Seeger, the objector’s opposition need not be a product of religious belief at all.  In my view, the ascent of individualism in the law’s treatment of conscience (i.e., “What do I need to prove to qualify?”) is related to the ascent of individualism in the religious believer’s treatment of conscience (i.e., “Is my military service ultimately a question for me or for my religious community?”), though I cannot trace the causal relationship with much specificity beyond the recognition that social norms shape law, and law shapes social norms.  Religious communities are not immune to this dynamic.